After the frenzied summitry in Anchorage and Washington last month, one thing is certain: Ukraine needs security. Who provides it — and how — are still open questions. For now, only Russia and Ukraine have clear answers.
Ever since talks in Istanbul failed in 2022, Russia has insisted that it must be included in any list of guarantors of Ukraine’s security, with a veto over what others might do to help Kyiv defend itself against future aggression.
Ukraine, by contrast, maintains that because some allies — above all, the United States — are not yet prepared to welcome it into NATO, it seeks legally binding, robust military assistance, including a physical international presence on the ground. For Kyiv, Russian participation in such efforts is out of the question, as any future aggression is overwhelmingly likely to come from Russia itself.
In other capitals, the debate about security guarantees remains deadlocked. The idea of putting boots on the ground is an electoral nightmare for most European politicians: Voters don’t want to hear about it. But these concerns are unfounded.
A true security guarantee is an obligation — the promise of one state to fight on behalf of another in case of an attack. NATO’s Article 5 is perhaps the most famous example. Any “Article 5 security guarantees,” as President Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff characterized possible arrangements, implies “I will fight for you.” Everything else — military and technical aid, training and political support — is not a guarantee but assistance. The good news is that assistance, if applied comprehensively and consistently, can be as effective as an explicit security guarantee.
Right now, the front line in Ukraine stretches over 750 miles, with the longer border with Russia liable to expand it. The financial costs, logistics, personnel requirements and operational challenges of maintaining a European peacekeeping presence across that distance, separating two battle-hardened armies bent on vengeance, would be overwhelming and unprecedented.
Similarly, stationing foreign troops far behind the lines as “reassurance forces” (the option most often floated as an alternative to more robust peacekeeping) would also have limited effect. The Ukrainian people would almost certainly welcome such deployments. But reassurance forces would neither hasten the war’s end nor prevent hostilities from reigniting after any ceasefire. Moscow, meanwhile, has already rejected the idea, claiming it would be a pretense for putting a NATO presence on Ukrainian soil.
Instead of debating such dead ends, Ukraine’s partners should immediately move to provide a robust assistance package, coupled with firm commitments to Ukraine’s political integration in the West. Weapons need to be provided at an even larger scale — to be mass-produced in Western countries as well as in Western-financed factories inside Ukraine. Ensuring uninterrupted supply on a strict timeline is vital. The buildup of a European military-industrial complex needs to take place alongside Ukraine’s admission to the European Union as a full member on an accelerated (though still merit-based) schedule.
The promise of support and the accession path need to be made legally binding. Ukrainians remember that the nonbinding 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which offered Ukraine security assurance in exchange for giving up its nuclear arsenal, hasn’t counted for much. As of January, Kyiv had signed 28 bilateral security agreements with its partners, including the United States. Again, all were political, not legal, acts. And little has been heard about their implementation since.
In addition, partners might consider providing what Kyiv pleaded for in 2022: closing Ukraine’s skies. NATO could deploy air defense systems and fighter jets from European territory (or even from inside Ukraine) to intercept Russian missiles, drones and bombers. At the same time, Western partners could allow Ukraine to unconditionally strike deeper into Russian territory, making Vladimir Putin’s regime feel the costs of continuing the war indefinitely.
For Ukraine to be able to resist future Russian aggression, its military would need to be brought fully in line with NATO standards. Additionally, allies could pre-position stockpiles of ammunition, fuel and equipment on Ukrainian soil — while also expanding intelligence sharing, strengthening cyberdefenses and undertaking joint patrols in the Black Sea.
Such a blend of robust military assistance and political integration could, over time, resolve Ukraine’s security dilemma. Ukraine would emerge as a well-armed member of the West, with Russia forced to accept its existence as a European nation capable of deterring future aggression.
Make no mistake: Even without a formal veto, Putin will bluster about these measures, claiming they violate any number of Moscow’s “red lines.” But Ukraine’s partners must not be deterred. None of these measures are security guarantees that would oblige them to go to war. They only ensure that Ukraine can defend itself when Russia tries to attack again. Comprehensive and ironclad Western assistance creates the necessary conditions for meaningful deterrence.
But even if Ukraine, the rest of Europe and the United States manage to build this new security architecture — and present it to Russia as a fact on the ground — that will be only the first stage. The next must be far more grueling: direct negotiations between Ukraine and Russia on how the two countries will coexist in the long term. Only through such talks can the mission of securing Ukraine — and, by extension, Europe — be considered successful.
About the author: Dmytro Kuleba was Ukraine’s foreign minister from 2020 to 2024.
